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The promulgation of sentencing guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 1 if ultimately deemed valid, will introduce a new era in the application of criminal sanctions in federal court. The past pattern of sentencing, under which the judge had exclusive authority to set sanctions within typically broad congressional ranges, will disappear entirely. In the future, an administrative agency composed of seven commissioners, appointed and removable by the President, 2 will determine the range of sentences that the judge may impose.
The Sentencing Commission undoubtedly is a convenient solution' to the problem of sentence disparity. 4 However, convenience is not a hallmark of the separation of powers 5 and does not cure a violation of its dictates. The Constitution's separation of powers into three branches provides "structural protections against abuse of power" ' that do not turn upon the momentary beneficence of particular officers. The Sentencing imprisonment. 1 5 A product of the revolt against the disparity that this sentencing system produced, 1 the sentencing guideline system will replace individualized consideration with a uniform sentence for all offenders who fit within each administratively established classification. 1 7 Under the new system, the sentence will be determinate," 8 and the United States Parole Commission will be abolished. 9 The Sentencing Commission will exercise vast discretion over the federal criminal law. Its guidelines will determine, on the basis of criminal history and current offense, whether a fine, probation, incarceration, 2° or even possibly death 21 will be imposed on a convicted defendant. The guidelines will also specify binding ranges for the prison terms that defendants must serve, the maximum of which may be no more than twentyfive per cent greater than the minimum. 22 Although the Commission was directed to base the guidelines on principles of incapacitation, deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation, Congress has provided the Commission no basis for resolving the conflicts that frequently arise 23 among these objec-
See 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1982) (authorizing United
States Parole Commission to release prisoner if release would not "depreciate the seriousness of the offense" or "jeopardize the public welfare"). For discussion of the United States Parole Commission and the differences between its guidelines for release and those of the United States Sentencing Commission, see infra text accompanying notes 81-87. 19. The Parole Commission will establish release dates for all persons sentenced under current sentencing practice but will be abolished five years after the effective date of the first guidelines. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(b)(1), 98 Stat. 2032 Stat. (1984 (Jan. 8, 1987) [hereinafter Justice Department Memorandum] (copy on file with author) (arguing that Commission has authority to promulgate capital punishment guidelines). Because of political considerations, the Commission decided not to include capital punishment within its first set of guidelines; however, according to its Chairman, the Commission may address the death penalty issue soon. U.S. Panel, Bowing to Congress, Votes Against the Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at A22, col. 3. But cf Freed & Liman, Federal Panel Has No Authority over the Death Penalty, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 10, 1987, at 13, col. 1. (arguing that Commission lacks legal power to restore death penalty).
See Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualiza
22. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1), (b) (Supp. III 1985) . The range may be less than 25%. See S. REP. No. 223, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1983) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 223 ] ("The breadth of the sentencing range provided in each guideline is a matter for the Commission to decide so long as it is within the 25-percent limit . . .).
23. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 284-85 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing failure to articulate sentencing policy from among four purposes of criminal law); United tives. 24 The Commission may specify a sentence for a particular offense primarily on an assessment of the offense's harm to the community relative to the harm from other offenses. 25 Within the wide ranges established by Congress, 2 " the Commission will decide what sentence a particular offense should receive and whether the judge should have any discretion in its imposition. 2 Because of the presumed judicial expertise in sentencing, 28 the sevenmember Commission is established as an independent agency in the judicial branch. 29 Recognizing that the establishment of sentencing policy was not exclusively a judicial function, 30 however, Congress rejected proposals to place authority to promulgate guidelines solely in the judiciary x and instead constituted the Commission with a distinctly executive character. Unlike other judicial branch agencies, whose members are appointed and controlled by article III judges, 2 the commissioners of the Sentencing Commission are appointed and may be removed by the President, 33 and NEWS (99 Stat.) , there are no mandatory minimum sentences in the federal code. Consequently, a judge may impose any sentence up to the specified statutory maximum.
27 . See Corrections Dig., Feb. 4, 1987, at 9, 10 (although initial guidelines give judges much discretion, Commission will be able to eliminate judges' discretion within one year).
28. The guidelines have legal force similar to regulations issued by administrative or executive agencies. Although the guidelines must sit before Congress for 180 days before they go into effect, only congressional legislation can block the implementation of the guidelines or change any of their terms. 3 5 Guidelines issued by sentencing commissions are now in force in several jurisdictions. 3 " However, the federal Commission is the most ambitious extension of the sentencing commission concept. 3 7 Not only will the Commission's recommendations automatically govern the imposition of sanctions in all federal criminal cases unless Congress enacts countervailing legislation, but the guidelines will restrict sentencing judges far more than the restrictions in effect in any of the states or court systems that have adopted guideline systems. 38 The statute establishing the Commission proJustice has proposed an amendment to clarify that the salary increase that a United States district judge serving on the Commission receives should be treated as a stipend. vides that the court "shall" impose a sentence within the guidelines, unless the court finds a factor in the case not adequately considered by the Commission.
3 9 A judge who disagrees with the guidelines themselves and not with their application to the particular case may not deviate from the guideline sentence. 40 Even if a judge believes that a particular sentence is too harsh for a person convicted of a certain crime, she must impose that sentence if the offense and offender fit within the Commission's classifications.
To reduce judicial discretion in sentencing even further, Congress has for the first time provided for the appeal of criminal sentences. 
45. The court of appeals' reasonableness calculation is to be based upon the reasons given for the imposition of a particular sentence, id., reasons that in the case of a departure must include factors not adequately considered by the Commission, id. § 3553(b). According to the legislative history, neither the district courts nor the appellate courts are to consider the substance of a guideline. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 17, at 153 (district judge may depart only for factors not adequately considered by Commission); id. at 181 (guidelines not subject to appellate review). Thus as the Commission steadily eliminates factors on which the judge may base a departure, see id. at 154, all flexibility will be removed from application of the guidelines. If, however, the terms "not adequately considered," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), and "in violation of law," id. § 3742, are interpreted expansively to allow for departures and appellate review of the substance of the guidelines, the nondelegation challenge might be met. Cf Conyers, Unresolved Issues in the Federal Sentencing Reform Act, 32 FED.
In addition to the guidelines, the Commission will also promulgate policy statements for plea bargains," 6 recommend legislation concerning the criminal justice system to Congress, 47 and respond to petitions from offenders who allege that the guidelines for their offense should be changed. 4 Because the Commission's responsibilities are so great, the first commissioners are serving on a full-time basis. 4 9 Federal judges on the Commission are excused from their responsibility to reside in their judicial districts. 5 0
II. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION AS AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF POWER
The Sentencing Reform Act violates the separation of powers in two ways. Locating the power to determine sentences in an administrative agency violates the nondelegation doctrine. At the same time, the requirement that three article III judges sit on the Sentencing Commission, with the possibility that the President might appoint-and discharge-up to six judges, compromises judicial independence and impartiality.
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine
Article I of the Constitution provides that "all legislative powers... shall be vested in the Congress of the United States."" The nondelegation doctrine embodies the notion that the "formulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the electorate."" 2 Though perhaps underenforced, 53 the doctrine retains vitality. The nondelegation B. NEws & J. 68, 69-70 (1985) (suggesting that defendant be permitted to appeal guideline sentence on grounds that it is greater than necessary to serve statutory purposes of sentencing).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(D) (Supp. III 1985) . 47. The Commission is required to report to Congress both its recommendations for new correctional facilities, id. § 994(g), and for changes in penal sanctions, id. § 994(q).
48. Id. § 994(r) ("The Commission shall give due consideration to any petition filed by a defendant requesting modification in the guidelines utilized in sentencing such defendant."). The Commission is also empowered to establish a research and development program on sentencing, to collect data on sentencing, and to conduct sentencing programs and workshops. 54 and granting no special deference to an agency's interpretation of its enabling act, 55 the Supreme Court has ensured that administrative agencies work within the law rather than make it. 5 6 Although the reach of the nondelegation doctrine has not been carefully delimited, certain crucial choices must be made by elected representatives in Congress. 57 Where the federal government seeks to trespass on the rights of states, 58 to encroach on constitutionally protected interests, 59 or to intrude on fundamental values, 6 it must do so through the deliberative processes of the legislature. In Kent v. Dulles, 61 for example, the Court held that the Secretary of State could not deny passports to persons because of their membership in the Communist Party. Refusing to reach the constitutional issue, the Court determined that the individual's interest at stake was so fundamental that it could be infringed only with explicit congressional authorization: "Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them."
The same principle, that only Congress may decide whether a person's liberty should be restricted, has been applied to the determination of criminal sanctions. guard against executive lawmaking in the criminal law. 5 Although primarily addressed to the substantive criminal law, both the rule of lenity and the void-for-vagueness doctrine have constrained vague specifications of criminal penalties. 6 Specifically, current jurisprudence prohibits the executive from establishing the sanction for a criminal offense. Congress itself may set sanctions for violations of administrative regulations and allow the agency to write the regulation, 6 7 but an administrative agency does not have the authority to prescribe criminal sanctions. 6 8 The distinction between setting the penalty and determining the elements of the offense may appear formalistic. The executive might determine the sanction for a specific offense by directing the appropriate administrative agency to promulgate a regulation making that conduct illegal. The limited scope of any particular agency's mandate, however, and the requirement that it base its decisions on reasons that derive from that mandate," restricts the range of conduct it may subject to a sanction. The executive may not, for example, direct the Securities and Exchange Commission to make criminal the operation of a gambling enterprise or any other activity outside its specific regulatory ambit. By preventing agencies from determining the sanctions to be imposed for the violation of their own regulations, the Court has implicitly required Congress to specify the relative severity of the violation of various agencies' rules. (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on ... the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment."). Similar constraints have been erected to cabin the discretion of the one executive branch agency that arguably has authority over criminal sanctions, the United States Attorney's Offices. 71 Although the charge decision indirectly affects the sentencing decision by determining whether a person may be sentenced and the range within which that sentence must be imposed, 7 2 various institutions check the prosecutor's authority to unilaterally dictate a sentence. The prosecutor's charge decision must be approved at the grand jury and preliminary hearing stages 73 and must, of course, be based on sufficient evidence to convict. A decision to reduce a charge already brought must be based on legitimate prosecutorial considerations. 7 ' One might imagine separate statutes that imposed fixed sentences of different durations for the identical criminal conduct. In this situation, none of the procedural safeguards would prevent the executive from determining the sentence imposed; the prosecutor's charge decision would effectively determine the sentence imposed upon conviction. In rejecting a nondelegation challenge to a prosecution under two statutes which made the identical conduct criminal, however, the Court rested its decision on the fact that the choice of statute under a system with no mandatory minimums "does not empower the Government to predetermine ultimate criminal sanctions. 7 1 5 Where the statutory structure did empower the government to determine sanctions, then presumably the harsher statute would be unconstitutional.
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Moreover, the courts have prevented prosecutors from directly determining the sentence on a charge already brought. The sentencing judge retains virtually unchecked authority to reject any plea bargain that, by dismissing charges, limits the punishment that the court may impose. it will result in too light a sentence for the defendant or otherwise intrude on the judicial sentencing function, the court may reject a plea bargain that drops charges 78 or specifies a sentence to be imposed. 7 9 By exercising independent sentencing authority, the court prevents the sentencing decision from being delegated to those "whose temperment [is] shaped by their adversar [ial] duties." '8 0
B. The Parole Commission Example
The United States Parole Commission illustrates the operation of the separation of powers in the criminal law. An independent agency in the Department of Justice, 81 the Parole Commission has jurisdiction over parole decisions for all persons imprisoned for violating the federal criminal code. 82 To promote uniformity in prison terms for offenders convicted of similar crimes, the Commission has since 1973 used guidelines which emphasize current offense and criminal history and which provided the model for the sentencing guidelines system. In upholding the constitutionality of the Parole Commission's release decisions, the courts have emphasized the following point: The release decision must be within both the broad ranges allowed by statute and also, crucially, the smaller ranges set by the judicially imposed sentence.8 While the Parole Commission has repeatedly changed the sanctions attached to particular offenses to reflect the values and law enforcement priorities of an incumbent administration, 85 In January 1983, the Commission, under new leadership, doubled the minimum period of incarcera-for a longer period than the trial judge has determined is appropriate after hearing the defendant's case. 86 Necessarily, therefore, the Parole Commission's decisions are constrained by the strategies and decisions of the judge and prosecutor. 8 7
C. The Unconstitutionality of the Commission
The Sentencing Commission intrudes into an area where decisions must be made through the deliberative processes of Congress. Every one of its guidelines, all of which go into effect unless Congress passes and the President signs an act to the contrary, 88 will reflect the type of substantive moral judgment that has traditionally been reserved for Congress. The Commission's most recent set of guidelines, for example, departed significandy from past sentencing practice in requiring terms of imprisonment for persons convicted of price-fixing under the antitrust laws or paying a gratuity to an elected official. 8 9 If the Justice Department interpretation is followed, the Commission may be able to decide both whether the death penalty should be restored and the crimes for which it should be imposed."' As with the United States Parole Commission, Congress created the Sentencing Commission as an independent agency. Despite this effort to insulate the Commission from constitutional challenge, 91 however, neither the Commission's "independent" status nor its formal placement in the judiciary 92 saves it from constitutional attack. Independent status, whatever its current viability in other respects, 9 " is irrelevant to nondele- 86. An inmate may not be released until she has served a portion of her judicially imposed sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1982) , and must be released at the expiration of her sentence, less good time she has earned. Id. § 4164. Although the Parole Commission's discretion is thus bounded, it too has been subject to criticism. 97 and the President's authority over its members, 9 the majority of whom have no connection to the judiciary other than their service on the Commission, to claim that the Commission is in the judiciary rather than the executive branch is simply not colorable.
Unlike the Parole Commission, the Sentencing Commission's power will likely not be limited by the judicial imposition of a sentence. The Sentencing Commission's guidelines are mandatory. 9 9 Although judges may voice disagreement with the guidelines through letters to the Sentencing Commission, 10 0 the Commission's decision as to whether a factor is important in sentencing is final,'" and judges must adhere to it in imposing sentence. Only if the standards for departure and appellate review are stretched to make the guidelines into presumptive recommendations can the nondelegation challenge be met. 1 02 The provision that the guidelines remain before Congress for 180 days before they take effect does not save the Commission. 1 3 Congressional oversight does not turn administratively promulgated rules into legislation or cure a delegation that is too broad. 104 The Supreme Court has held that Congress may act only through legislation passed by the two houses and signed by the President. 1 0 5 Even when Congress has held hearings on an administrative practice or has long been aware of it, the Court will not attribute significance to congressional inaction or acquiescence. 10 6 Because there are numerous reasons why Congress might be silent, 10 7 the absence of repeal cannot be taken as the constitutional equivalent of an affirmation of an administrative proposal.
III. JUDICIAL MEMBERSHIP AND THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING

COMMISSION
Congress' effort to cloak the Commission's activities in judicial robes, simply by placing judges on it, constitutes a deeper flaw in its constitutionality. The judiciary in our tripartite system is limited to deciding "cases" and "controversies" and exercising those non-adjudicative administrative powers that are essential to the running of the courts. The authority that the Commission possesses to implement final binding action on a matter outside the peculiar interests of the judiciary, and its mixed composition of judges and other presidential appointees renders the Commission unconstitutional. 
A. The Case and Controversy Requirement and the Modern Judiciary
By its terms, the Constitution limits the judiciary to the decision of cases and controversies. 1 0 8 Along with the "compensation" and "good behavior" clauses, 09 the case and controversy requirement reflects a commitment to the principle of judicial independence. 1 10 As Alexander Hamilton argued, "the interpretation of the laws is the proper and regular province of the courts," and "liberty would have everything to fear from [the judiciary's] union with either of the other departments." ' 1 The realities of administration of the modern judiciary preclude any contention that judges are limited to mere "bench-sitting."
112 Judges today promulgate rules of court procedure, 1 " assign other judges to hear cases, 11 4 and perform various internal disciplinary functions. 
Vol. 96: 1363, 1987
under article II of the Constitution, the "Courts of Law" may be assigned the power to appoint inferior federal officers. 1 ' Rather, the case and controversy requirement and the principle of judicial independence it reflects forbids judges from making rules outside the case and controversy context on matters external to the administration of justice or from entering a formal working relationship with members of the other branches of government. At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers rejected two proposals that would have combined justices of the Supreme Court with members of the Executive Branch. The Council of Revision, on which "a convenient number of the national judiciary1 plicitly bar dual-holding by judges, 120 set the tempo for future consideration of the constitutional limitations on activities that may be assigned judges.
In 1793, the Justices of the Jay Court responded to an inquiry by Thomas Jefferson whether the judiciary would make itself available to advise the executive on legal questions, by stating that "the lines of separation between the three departments of the government" forbade the judiciary from extrajudicially advising the president. . Perhaps significantly, Justice Iredell, who did hear the pension claims, felt compelled to write, "If therefore it appeared to me that this question could by any possibility come before me as Judge. . .I ought not to principle important to freedom that the judicial should be distinct from, and independent of, the legislative department."
125
Concern with these twin matters-the creation of a formal relationship between article III judges and members of the other branches and the assignment to judges of authority to legislate on matters outside the particular concern of the judiciary-has continued to the present day. Congress still may not require courts to render decisions that will be subject to legislative revision-an activity in which judges and legislators act as partners; 12 and its power to permit article III judges to serve on legislative courts has been closely questioned. 1 7 Congress' decision to reconstitute the Court of Claims as an article III court, for example, reflected in part a belated realization that it would be unconstitutional for article III judges to serve on a non-article III body. Federal System, 1789 -1800 , at 18 (1987 REv. 1010 REv. , 1022 REv. (1924 ment of that authority outside the judiciary might be disruptive of the judiciary's independence. 134 However, it may not engage in nonadjudicatory behavior that is substantive in nature. 3
B. Constitutional History and the Activities of Individual Judges
Drawing on history, several commentators have suggested that judges may perform extrajudicial functions as individuals that they could not perform as judges.' 36 There is a long tradition of justices participating in (Courts "must, therefore, be invested with incidental powers of self-protection."). The Jay Court may have recognized this distinction. Though it refused to advise President Washington on the construction of foreign treaties, see supra text accompanying note 121, it did write him about the duties of judges riding on circuit. The argument from past practice, however, renders an incomplete historical account. The early practice of the Supreme Court Justices reflected a complex understanding of the constitutional restrictions: Whereas informal advice-giving was constitutional, actual participation in legislative revision was not.' 39 Even the early extrajudicially active Justices recognized boundaries to extrajudicial commitments, declining positions that might have compromised their independence. 40 John Jay felt that a judge could undertake extrajudicial activity as long as it was "consistent and compatible with" the judicial function.' 4 ' John Marshall stepped down from his position as Secretary of State when appointed to the bench, agreeing to perform the duties of the office only until a replacement could be found.
tion of extrajudicial responsibilities by judges has long elicited controversy among judges""' as well as legislators. 145 The practice of judges performing extrajudicial activites is thus not nearly as "unbroken" and "systematic," 1 ' as would be necessary to support the implication of a constitutional norm. 14 7 Indeed, the argument gets the principle exactly backwards. The only significant difference between assigning a duty to a judge as an individual and as a member of a court is that as an individual she will be acting outside the judiciary. 4 But by was "contrary to the spirit of the Constitution" and may have been ratified only because of speculation that he would resign from his judicial post. ("[O] ur inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and independent agencies ....") and id. at 968-74 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing historical use of legislative veto) with Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 509-10 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that claim of executive privilege dismissed by Court has been practice of Presidents since George Washington), save perhaps where it is "unbroken" and "has prevailed almost from the inception of the national government." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (practice must be "long pursued" and "never before questioned"); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474-75 (1915 what ought to be and regards patterns of practice as principles of law"). As the Supreme Court has never decided the propriety of extrajudicial service, it is arguable that the judiciary has never acquiesced in the practice.
148. The irrelevance of the term "court" to article III restrictions on extrajudicial activities is aptly demonstrated by the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. § 593 (1982) . Although the Constitution only allows Congress to place the appointment power in the "Courts of Law," the three judges rendering constitutional otherwise unconstitutional behavior if performed in another branch of government, this principle would sacrifice both individual judicial independence and the interest of the judiciary as a whole in the control of its members.
Virtually every state court and legislature" 4 9 has found that a judge's occupation of an office in another department of government or performance of functions that could compromise her judicial impartiality violates either specific constitutional prohibitions' 50 or separation of powers. 5 ' Although the judge who is appointed to the bench from an executive or legislative office may bring her own prejudices with her, 5 2 concurrent participation in policymaking threatens the judge's ability to make an independent judicial decision, 153 accords the political decision of an administrative agency a presumptive legality that it might not otherwise who actually appoint an independent counsel under the Act are convened solely for that purpose and do not exist independently as a court. See id. If the three judges who appoint the independent counsel must be considered a "court," so should the three judges who sit on the Sentencing Commission.
149. For a discussion of the role of state law as a source of federal constitutional norms, 154 and, by occupying much of a judge's time, impairs the judiciary's ability to perform its constitutionally assigned functions.
155
C. Judicial Participation on the Sentencing Commission
These twin concepts-that judges may not enter into a formal working relationship with members of the other branches or exercise rulemaking power on matters that are not ancillary to the judicial process-give content to the Supreme Court's dicta that "executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on [article III] judges." ' 
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Under these principles, the Sentencing Commission violates the separation of powers.
The union of the judiciary and the executive that the Sentencing Commission creates gives the executive a power considered among the more pernicious: the power to control the responsibilities of sitting judges. For most of constitutional history, a judge assigned to a particular circuit was required to reside in that circuit and could not be reassigned. 157 Although the immobile judiciary did not survive the 1922 creation of the Judicial Conference, the power of reassignment has always been placed within the judiciary. 15 The potential that certain assignments would be granted as political favors and that others would be used to dictate outcomes fueled the concern that the Chief Justice felt about his own power of assignment, 1 59 as well as the common assumption that the power could not be placed outside the judiciary. 18° Under the Sentencing Reform Act, how-ever, the executive branch chooses the judges who then are excused from their responsibilities to reside in their districts and are required to serve full-time on the Commission."' Not only does the provision that the President appoint at least three judges to the Commission provide him a vehicle for virtually the first time 16 2 through which he can determine the assignments of sitting judges, but the composition of the Commission is such that the four non-judicial presidential appointees at any one time may be able to determine whether the judges on the Commission should be summoned to Washington or allowed to stay in their courtrooms.
Moreover, the Sentencing Commission effects a permanent collaborative relationship between the judiciary and executive that violates the norm of judicial independence. Service on the Commission is not merely transient. Although the statutory requirement that at least three article III judges serve on the Commission may not be constitutionally dispositive, 6 3 it is indicative of the permanent association of the judiciary with the executive and legislative branches that the Sentencing Commission represents. Like other public offices, Commission membership embraces concepts of tenure, duration, emoluments and duties, 14 and involves the exercise of "significant authority [under] the laws of the United States." 1 5 The judges on the Commission will exercise substantial rulemaking authority 6 on a full-time basis, 167 for a period of six years," 6 8 and, in the case of a district judge, will receive an extra stipend."' 9 Indeed, Congress understood that the Commissioners were officers of the United States when it decided to place the appointment power with the President. 1 7 1 Finally, the nature of the Commission's authority is such that it might well be unconstitutional even if it were solely within the judiciary. The type of legislative rulemaking that the Sentencing Commission will engage in both involves the judiciary in the decision of matters of broad public policy outside the confines of a specific case 17 1 and breaks with the separation of powers in allowing the legislators who promulgated rules to also apply them.
1 72 As many commentators have noted, this power is justified with respect to procedural rules because of the courts' special expertise and because procedural rulemaking is inherent to the judicial process. 17 Neither rationale applies to sentencing. The court has repeatedly emphasized that the considerations that go into determining sentencing ranges, such as deterrence and just deserts, are peculiarly a matter for legislative determination. 74 Moreover, though courts may consider the advice and practices of other judges when imposing sentences, 17 5 the specification of sentence ranges has never been considered an inherent judicial function like the promulgation of court rules. 1 7 The guidelines that the federal Sentencing Commission will promulgate must of course be construed and applied by the district courts in every sentencing and will likely be frequently challenged on constitutional 17 and statutory grounds 17 8 in the courts of appeals. Judges on the Commission will thus necessarily review their concurrent actions as legislators, implicating precisely the concerns that led to the rejection of the Council of Revision" 9 and that lie at the core of the separation of powers doctrine. 1 , 0
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal Sentencing Commission currently is constitutionally infirm. The Sentencing Reform Act vests more legislative authority than the separation of powers permits in an administrative agency composed of seven presidential appointees. The confounding of the separate functions of the different branches is aggravated by the requirement that judges be appointed to the Commission and subject to possible removal by the President.
The hope for sentencing reform, however, is not dead. Congress may reconstitute the Commission as an advisory body in the judiciary, 1 or enact the guidelines into law, thus ensuring not only that the imposition of the criminal sanction is structured by a set of principles but also that sentencing guidelines will survive separation of powers challenges to their constitutionality. A system of appellate review for all sentences could prevent gross disparities.
18 2 With these fundamental changes, the Commission can bring rationality to federal sentencing without compromising judicial independence or removing the essential legislative and judicial checks on executive control of the criminal law. (July 20, 1942) ) ("plainly inadmissible" for Justice "to pass upon proposals involving questions of constitutional power or other questions which would be subject to review by the courts"). The argument that judges on the Commission might recuse themselves from cases where their impartiality might be questioned, see In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime Subpoena of Scarfo, 783 F.2d 370, 381 (3d Cir. 1986), proves too much. As only a few judges exercise any of the rulemaking power delegated to the judiciary, such an argument would effectively gut the separation of the legislature from the judiciary. The judiciary could exercise rulmaking power over any issue, no matter how politically charged, so long as only a few judges exercised effective power. Moreover, recusal in all of these cases would likely excessively burden the courts and neither redress the Commission member's influence on his colleagues, see Comment, supra note 144, at 1013 & n.100, nor mitigate the impact that politically controversial activity such as the promulgation of guidelines would have on the public's perception of judicial impartiality.
See supra
181. See supra note 38 (discussing voluntary judicially-promulgated guidelines). 182. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCES (1968) (recommending appellate review).
